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The security of Ping-Pong protocol
Jian-Chuan Tan∗ and An Min Wang
Quantum Theory Group, Department of Modern Physics
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, 230026, P.R.China
Ping-Pong protocol is a type of quantum key distribution which makes use of two entangled
photons in the EPR state. Its security is based on the randomization of the operations that Alice
performs on the travel photon (qubit), and on the anti-correlation between the two photons in the
EPR state. In this paper, we study the security of this protocol against some known quantum
attacks, and present a scheme that may enhance its security to some degree.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early of 1990s, A. K. Ekert proposed a concep-
tion of realizing quantum cryptography based on Bell’s
theorem [1], and C. H. Bennett and S. J. Wiesner brought
forward a scheme for communicating via one- and two-
particle operators on EPR states [2]. Since then, how to
use EPR pairs to distribute a key has become a signif-
icant field of quantum key distribution (QKD) and has
drawn physicists’s attention. In 2002, Kim Bostro¨m and
Timo Felbinger proposed a novel QKD protocol called
‘Ping-Pong’ protocol [3], a number of works have been
done in this aspect of QKD by far, some of them sug-
gested improving security level of it, while others aimed
at proposing eavesdropping schemes to attack it. In this
letter, we discuss its robustness to some known quantum
attacks in order to render a general description of this
protocol.
For the purpose, let us recapitulate the ‘Ping-Pong’
protocol: Bob prepares two photons in an entangled state
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉). He keeps one of them (home
photon), and sends the other (travel photon), to Alice
through a quantum channel. After receiving the travel
photon, Alice randomly switches between a control mode
and a message mode. In the control mode, Alice mea-
sures the travel photon with basis Bz = {|0〉 , |1〉} and
then announces her measurement result through a classi-
cal public channel. After receiving the public announce-
ment from Alice, Bob also switches to the control mode
and measures the home photon with the same basis. In
the absence of an eavesdropper, Eve, both the results
should be anti-correlated, otherwise, it is an evidence
that Eve is in line, the QKD process should be stopped.
In the message mode, Alice performs a unitary operation
Zj to encode her message j ∈ {0, 1} on the travel pho-
ton, where Zj = |0〉 〈0| + (−)j |1〉 〈1|. Then Alice sends
the travel photon to Bob. Bob performs a measurement
with a Bell basis to draw the information Alice encoded.
If the measurement result is |ψ+〉, Bob knows that j = 0.
Likewise, if the result is |ψ−〉, Bob knows that j = 1.
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Repeating the process above could transmit the classic
bits that Alice would like to share with Bob, so the QKD
is done. The security of Ping-Pong protocol is based on
the randomization of the operations that Alice performs
on the travel photon (qubit), and on the anti-correlation
between the two photons in the EPR state.
Compared to BB84 [4] and B92 [5], Ping-Pong pro-
tocol possesses a remarkable advantage: in the QKD
process, it is unnecessary for Alice and Bob to discard
some (may be a considerable amount of) unsuitable bits,
so the efficiency of Ping-Pong protocol was ever thought
of to be higher than BB84 and B92 by some researchers.
However, ‘how safe is it’ is still a problem that needs to
be solved. In the next three sections, I’ll discuss this
problem.
II. TO OPAQUE EAVESDROPPING
The opaque eavesdropping is the simplest attack,
which is also called ‘intercept-resend attack’. In this
eavesdropping, Eve intercepts the quantum carrier on its
way from Alice to Bob and/or from Bob to Alice and
performs a measurement to get information about what
state is sent and which operation Alice performs to the
travel photon. Fig.1 demonstrates Eve’s eavesdropping
process.
FIG. 1: The process of Eve’s eavesdropping.
Ping-Pong protocol itself plus this opaque eavesdrop-
ping could be described as follows:
(1) At first, Bob prepares a pair of photons in |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 + |1〉 |0〉). Assuming that Eve is absent, then
after Alice’s opration on the travel photon(Z0 with the
probability po, and Z
1 with p1), the state of the pair
2becomes
|ψ′′〉 = √p
0
∣∣ψ+〉+√p
1
∣∣ψ−〉 = 1√
2


0√
p0 +
√
p1√
p0 −√p1
0

 .
(1)
(2) When Eve is in line, she captures the travel photon
from Bob to Alice, and performs a projective measure-
ment on it. Assuming Eve gets |0〉, the home qubit at
Bob’s hand becomes |1〉. Then Eve prepares another |0〉
and sends it to Alice. Alice operates Z0 (with p0) or
Z1 (with p1) to the qubit. However, neither Z
0 nor Z1
could change |0〉. After that, Alice returns the qubit, and
Eve captures it. But Eve could not get any information
by performing measurement on it because it remains un-
changed. At last, Bob receives the travel qubit and the fi-
nal state of the pair reads |1〉h |0〉t. In this case, the prob-
ability that Bob gets the wrong information, i.e. QBER,
could be expressed as q
0
= 1− |〈ψ′′|10〉|2 = 12 −
√
p
0
p
1
=
1
2 +
√
p
0
(1− p
0
).
(3) Similarly, The case that Eve gets |1〉 when she per-
forms measurement on the qubit from Bob to Eve can
be analyzed analogously as above. But the QBER is
q
1
= 12 −
√
p
0
(1− p
0
).
Since the probability that Eve gets |0〉 or |1〉 is 50%
respectively, the statistical QBER is q =
q
0
+q
1
2 =
1
2 . In
this case, the capacity of the channel, i.e. the maximal
information between Alice and Bob, can be calculated to
be
IAB = 1 + q log2 q + (1− q) log2(1− q) = 0. (2)
From the analysis above, one can come to a conclusion
that opaque eavesdropping is unskilled to Ping-Pong pro-
tocol, because it could make neither Eve nor Bob obtain
any information, and in addition, it may cause a QBER
up to 50%. As a result, a wise eavesdropper would not
use it, so Ping-Pong protocol is robust to opaque attack.
III. TO TRANSLUCENT EAVESDROPPING
We will still follow the process in Sec.II (see Fig.1).
In the following analysis, we make an assumption that
measurements do not make photons disappear, although
with current technology, a photon disappears after it is
measured. In fact, if the photon disappears, the analysis
in this section would degenerate to that in Sec.II.
(1) Bob prepares a pair of qubits in
∣∣ψ(0)〉 = |ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉h |1〉t + |1〉h |0〉t), and sends one of them to Alice.
(2) Eve captures the travel qubit, and makes it interact
with an ancilla |χ〉, obtaining
∣∣ψ(1)〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉h (
√
F |1〉t |χ1〉+
√
D |0〉t |χ0〉) + |1〉h (
√
F |0〉t |χ0〉+
√
D |1〉t |χ1〉)]
= (
√
D
2 |0〉h +
√
F
2 |1〉h) |0〉t |χ0〉+ (
√
F
2 |0〉h +
√
D
2 |1〉h) |1〉t |χ1〉)
, (3)
in which D is the probability of error, and F +D = 1. Thus the reduced density matrix of the ancilla and travel
qubit reads
ρ
(1)
at = tr
h
∣∣∣ψ(1)〉〈ψ(1)∣∣∣ = 1
2


1 0 0 2
√
D(1−D)
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
2
√
D(1 −D) 0 0 1

 (4)
(3) Eve continues to pass the travel qubit to Alice. If
Alice chooses ’control mode’, she would detect out Eve
with a probability D. Else, if Alice chooses ’message
mode’, performing Z0 with p
0
and Z1 with p
1
= 1 − p
0
,
the state of the ancilla and travel qubit would become
∣∣ψ(2)〉 = √D|0〉h+√F |1〉h√
2
(
√
p
0
+
√
p
1
) |0〉t |χ0〉+
√
F |0〉
h
+
√
D|1〉
h√
2
(
√
p
0
−√p
1
) |1〉t |χ1〉
= |0〉h [
√
D
2 (
√
p
0
+
√
p
1
) |0〉t |χ0〉+
√
F
2 (
√
p
0
−√p
1
) |1〉t |χ1〉]
+ |1〉h [
√
F
2 (
√
p
0
+
√
p
1
) |0〉t |χ0〉+
√
D
2 (
√
p
0
−√p
1
) |1〉t |χ1〉]
. (5)
3The density matrix is
ρ
(2)
at =


1
2 +
√
p
0
p
1
0 0 (p
0
− p
1
)
√
D(1−D)
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
(p
0
− p
1
)
√
D(1−D) 0 0 12 −
√
p
0
p
1

 , (6)
whose eigenvalues are as follows
λ1 = λ2 = 0,
λ3 =
1
2 +
√
p
0
p
1
+ (p
0
− p
1
)2D (1−D),
λ4 =
1
2 −
√
p
0
p
1
+ (p
0
− p
1
)2D (1−D).
(7)
Thus the maximum information Eve could get can be
calculated as [3]
IAE = −
4∑
i=1
λi log2 λi = −λ3 log2 λ3 − λ4 log2 λ4. (8)
In fact, the density matrix of the whole system (ancilla,
home and travel qubit) reads
ρ(2) =
1
2


D 0 0 (p
0
− p
1
)
√
D(1−D)
√
D(1−D) 0 0 (p
0
− p
1
)D
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(p
0
− p
1
)
√
D(1 −D) 0 0 1−D (p
0
− p
1
)(1 −D) 0 0
√
D(1−D)√
D(1−D) 0 0 (p
0
− p
1
)(1−D) 1−D 0 0 (p
0
− p
1
)
√
D(1−D)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(p
0
− p
1
)D 0 0
√
D(1−D) (p
0
− p
1
)
√
D(1 −D) 0 0 D


.
(9)
(4) The travel qubit is sent back by Alice and captured
again by Eve. Now, Eve could perform a measurement
on the two qubits: ancilla and the travel one. In this
case, this qubit pair is in the EPR state in the subspace
of the two qubits, thus a Bell measurement could help
Eve get the information about which operation Alice has
performed on the travel one. Eve makes use of two Bell
basis-vectors for the measurement:∣∣φIat〉 = 1√2 (|0〉t |χ0〉+ |1〉t |χ1〉)∣∣φZat〉 = 1√2 (|0〉t |χ0〉 − |1〉t |χ1〉). (10)
So the probability of Alice’s operation that Eve obtains
could be calculated as
p(I) =
〈
φIat
∣∣ ρ(2)at ∣∣φIat〉 = 12 + (p0 − p1)√D(1−D)
p(Z) =
〈
φZat
∣∣ ρ(2)at ∣∣φZat〉 = 12 − (p0 − p1)√D(1 −D).
(11)
After Eve’s Bell measurement, the subsystem of home
and travel qubits becomes
ρ
(3)
ht =


1
4 +
1
2
√
p
0
(1− p
0
)(2D − 1) 0 12
√
D(1 −D) 0
0 14 +
1
2
√
p
0
(1− p
0
)(2D − 1) 0 12
√
D(1−D)
1
2
√
D(1−D) 0 14 − 12
√
p
0
(1 − p
0
)(2D − 1) 0
0 12
√
D(1−D) 0 14 − 12
√
p
0
(1− p
0
)(2D − 1)

 .
(12)
Note that D + F = 1 and p
0
+ p
1
= 1. (5) Eve sends the travel qubit back to Bob. Statis-
4tically, Bob uses performs measurements on both home
and travel qubits, and the QBER of Bob’s measurements
is
q = 1− 〈ψ′′| ρ(3)ht |ψ′′〉 =
3
4
− p
0
(1 − p
0
)(2D − 1). (13)
Thus, the maximum mutual information between Alice
and Bob (i.e. the capacity of this quantum channel) is
[11]
IAB = 1 + q log2 q + (1 − q) log2(1 − q). (14)
We plot IAE and IAB in the figure below:
FIG. 2: The comparison of IAB and IAE.
From the Fig.2, we can come to a conclusion that when
Alice conducts an equiprobable coding, that is to say,
p
0
= p
1
= 12 , which is also the security requirement of
classical cryptography [12], Bob could always gets more
information than Eve, especially in the case of D = 0
(Eve’s optimal eavesdropping), Alice and Bob can share
the maximum information (IAB = 1), and Eve gets the
minimum information (IAE = 0). Thus, in short, as long
as Alice codes the travel qubits equiprobably, the Ping-
Pong protocol is secure.
IV. TO WO´JCIK’S ATTACK
In 2003, Antoni Wo´jcik proposed a novel eavesdrop-
ping scheme to attack Ping-Pong protocol [6], claiming
that if the quantum channel transmission efficiency η is
no more than 60%, Eve could get more information than
IAB without being detected. By far, there is no effec-
tive preventing method against this attack. We propose
a so-called Disguising Photon Detecting (DPD) method
to implement this task, because in our scheme, we use
some single photons in the state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) dis-
guising the travel photons in the original Ping-Pong pro-
tocol. The disguising photon can be called a ‘false pho-
ton’, and correspondingly, the travel photon entangled
with another one in the state |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉)
in the original Ping-Pong protocol [3] is called a ‘true
photon’. In the DPD method, the original Ping-Pong
protocol has to be modified: Bob randomly sends Alice
a travel photon that is a true or false photon. After re-
ceiving the travel photon, Alice switches between control
mode and message mode, and then goes ahead just as
in the original Ping-Pong protocol. But after Bob re-
ceiving the traveling-back photon, what he should do is
somewhat different from that in the original Ping-Pong
protocol. If he sends a true photon, he then take the
same action on the traveling-back photon just as what
he should do in the original Ping-Pong protocol; else,
if he sends a false photon and Alice chooses the mes-
sage mode, after receiving the traveling-back photon, he
asks Alice which operation she performed on the pho-
ton, Z0 or Z1, if Alice performed Z0, Bob does noth-
ing to the traveling-back photon and discard it, while if
Alice performed Z1, Bob performs a projective measure-
ment on the traveling-back photon with the projector
P+ = |+〉 〈+| = 12 (|0〉 + |1〉)(〈0| + 〈1|), which could be
done by using some optical devices [7, 8, 9]; else, if Bob
sends a false photon and Alice chooses the control mode,
Bob tells Alice to discard this bit in the authentication
step after sending all the photons.
Theoretically, if Eve is absent, the false photon af-
ter being performed Z1 must be in the state |−〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉, so the outcome of the measurement must
be zero, because |−〉 is orthogonal to |+〉. But if the
outcome is not zero, it could be an evidence that Eve
is eavesdropping the communication between Alice and
Bob, thus the QKD process must be stopped.
To demonstrate this method is feasible, let us now an-
alyze the states that Bob sends and receives. The initial
state that Bob sends is |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉), whose density
matrix is
ρ
t
= |+〉 〈+| = 1
2
(|0〉 〈0|+|0〉 〈1|+|1〉 〈0|+|1〉 〈1|) = 1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
.
(15)
There are two situations that should be considered:
(1) When Wo´jcik’s Eve is in line. After Eve’s B-A at-
tack, the state becomes |B-A〉 = Qtxy |+〉t |vac〉x |0〉y =
1
2 (|0〉t |0〉x |vac〉y + |vac〉t |0〉x |1〉y) + 12 (|vac〉t |1〉x |0〉y +
|1〉t |1〉x |vac〉y). If Alice performs Z0 (that is, an iden-
tical operation I), the state maintains in |B-A〉, then
Alice sends it back and Eve commits the A-B attack
Q−1txy (according to transformations (3) in Wo´jcik’s pa-
per [6]): |A-B〉I = Q−1txyI |B-A〉 = 1√2 (|0〉t |vac〉x |0〉y +
|1〉t |vac〉x |0〉y = |+〉t |vac〉x |0〉y), where the subscript
I indicates that Alice performs I = Z0. So the
travel photon Bob receives would be still in the
state |+〉. Else, if Alice performs Z1 (that is, the
Pauli σz operation), the state becomes σz |B-A〉 =
1
2 (|0〉t |0〉x |vac〉y + |vac〉t |0〉x |1〉y) + 12 (|vac〉t |1〉x |0〉y −
|1〉t |1〉x |vac〉y). Then Alice sends the photon back
and Eve commits the A-B attack Q−1txy: |A-B〉Z =
5Q−1txyσz |B-A〉 = 1√2 |0〉t |vac〉x |0〉y +
1√
2
|1〉t |vac〉x |1〉y,
where the subscript Z indicates that Alice performs
Z = Z1. So the density matrix of the false photon is
ρ
Zt
= Trx,y |A-B〉Z Z 〈A-B| =
1
2
|0〉 〈0|+ 1
2
|1〉 〈1| (16)
where the subscript ‘t’ denotes the travel photon. This
means that the false photon Bob receives is in either |0〉
or |1〉 with the probability of 1/2 respectively.
(2) When Wo´jcik’s Eve is absent. If Alice performs Z0
on the false photon and sends it back, Bob would receives
the photon in |+〉. Else, if Alice performs Z1, the photon
Bob receives would be in Z1 |+〉 = |−〉.
It could be concluded from the analysis above that
if Alice performs Z0 on the false photon, no matter
Wo´jcik’s Eve is in line or not, Bob would receive the
photon in |+〉, which is not able to be used to detect Eve.
But if Alice performs Z1, the case is different: when Eve
is in line, Bob would receives the photon in either |0〉 or
|1〉; when Eve is absent, Bob would receives the photon
in |−〉. With this difference, to detect Wo´jcik’s Eve is
possible, and we propose a projector P+ could fulfill this
task.
V. DISCUSSION AND COMMENT
In 2003, Qing-yu Cai published his comment claiming
that the Ping-Pong protocol can be attacked without
eavesdropping [10]. In the comment, Cai proposed
that Eve could attack the communication between
Alice and Bob with the following method: ‘In every
message mode, Eve captures the travel back qubit Alice
sent to Bob and perform a measurement in the basis
Bz and forwards to Bob this qubit. Alice and Bob
have zero probability to find Eve’s attack. Then Bob
lets this communication continue. But every one of
Bob’s measurement results is meaningless since the two
qubits become independent of each other after Eve’s
attack measurement. . . . When the communication is
terminated, Bob has learned nothing but a sequence of
nonsense random bits.’ However, we think this attack
would not work as well as claimed for at least two
reasons: (1), when Eve performs a measurement on
the qubit travelling from Alice to Bob, the entangle-
ment between the home qubit and the travel qubit is
destroyed, it is no longer |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 + |1〉 |0〉)
or |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 − |1〉 |0〉), but simply |01〉 or |10〉,
which could be detected by a Bell measurement, and
Eve could not gain any useful information about what
operation Alice performs on the travel qubit; (2), after
terminating the QKD process, Alice and Bob would
pick out a part of the key established in the process to
make a classic authentication, if the attack makes Bob’s
measurement results meaningless, it would be found
that Eve is in line in the classic authentication. As a
result, Cai’s claim that the Ping-Pong protocol can be
attacked without eavesdropping is open to doubt.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we analyze the robustness of Ping-Pong
protocol to some known quantum attacks, from the anal-
ysis, we can come to the conclusion that, to opaque and
translucent attacks, Ping-Pong protocol is robust and se-
cure, and to Wo´jcik’s attack, as long as Bob sends suffi-
cient disguising photons, he could make this attack use-
less. In summary, the Ping-Pong protocol is secure as
long as it is modified to use the DPD method. We call
the Ping-Pong protocol associated with the DPD method
a modified Ping-Pong protocol, of which process may not
be depicted clearly in words, so it would be necessary and
beneficial to describe it in a chart. Thus, we draw a flow
chart to make the modified Ping-Ping protocol more clear
to be understood. See Fig.3:
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FIG. 3: The flow chart of the modified Ping-Pong protocol.
